Tagged: security theatre
Body scan boogie – (cont.)
Contrarian reader Andrew Bourke is reconsidering a trip to Disney World after seeing this video of Transportation Safety Agency screeners in Chattanooga Tennessee manhandling an upset three-year-old.
(If you can’t see the video, try this link.)
The San Francisco Chronicle explains:
A TSA employee gave Mandy the pat down and she started screaming and kicking her legs… Why was Mandy searched in the first place? She started crying when she was asked to put her teddy bear through the X-ray machine. This made it difficult for her to walk calmly through the metal detector and she set the machine off twice, which meant she “must be hand-searched.”
Body scan boogie
Get ready for Opt Out Day:
For those using Flash-impaired Apple products, try here. From the clever Taiwanese animators, Next Media. Hat tip: This week in Google.
Snow globe plot – foiled
The US Transportation Safety Administration now keeps airspace safe from attack by snow globes, as well as toothpaste, mouthwash, and hair gel.
A blog post by Patrick Smith, the airline pilot who posted this photo to his Flickr account, bores into the core irrationality of the phoney security restrictions citizens have acquiesced to since 9/11. Money quote:
Conventional wisdom says the [9/11] terrorists exploited a weakness in airport security by smuggling aboard boxcutters. But conventional wisdom is wrong. What they actually exploited was a weakness in our mindset — a set of presumptions based on the decades-long track record of hijackings. In years past, a takeover meant hostage negotiations and standoffs; crews were trained in the concept of “passive resistance.” What weapons the 19 men possessed mattered little; had boxcutters been on the contraband list, the men would have smuggled something else or fashioned their weapons from items on board. It didn’t matter. The success of their plan relied not on weaponry but on the element of surprise. And in this respect, their scheme was all but guaranteed not to fail.
For a number of reasons, most notably the awareness of passengers and crew, just the opposite is now true. Before the first of the Twin Towers had fallen to the ground, that element of surprise, and the boxcutters that went with it, were no longer a useful tool. Paradigm over. Hijackers today would face a planeload of frightened people ready to fight back, and thus an unaffordable probability of failure. The September 11th scheme is kaput.
Surprise has vanished by the time hijackers took over the fourth plane. Its passengers understood they had to take action, and did so, foiling the plot to use their plane as a weapon, albeit at the cost of their own lives.
Hat tip: Andrew Douglas
False positive
An apparently random swab test of Contrarian‘s new MacBook Pro at the Stanfield International Airport screening area this morning detected traces of nitroglycerin.
The CATSA agent who conducted the test summoned a supervisor who explained, pleasantly, that the machine had triggered an alarm. She proceeded to check my identification and ask a series of questions about medication, chemicals, and hand creams. My negative answers turned up no obvious source of nitro, resulting in a further swab test of my iPhone, a complete physical check of every item in my carry-on bag, and a rigorous, 90% pat-down.*
In all, my case drew upon the efforts of four CATSA agents, whose demeanor ranged from polite to cheerful. After half an hour, CATSA deemed Contrarian fit to fly.
Regular readers will know that I am no fan of airport security theatre. While I found this rigorous screening unpleasant, my initial reaction is that secondary, intensive screening following a positive indication for nitroglycerin probably falls into the small subset of CATSA protocols that actually make planes safer.
I am baffled as to what triggered the false positive result. The screen cleaning wipes I bought recently? A certain person’s hand cream? The pleasant supervisor said traces of nitro can be persistent, so I now wonder if I should allow an extra half hour for the flight home.
*The pat-down was 90% in the sense that it would not have caught the Christmas Day bomber, if you catch my drift.
The folly of security theatre
I’m late getting to this, but Washington Post columnist Fareed Zakaria captured the fundamental fallacy of Washington’s reaction to the Christmas Day [un-]Bomber.
The purpose of terrorism is to provoke an overreaction. Its real aim is not to kill the hundreds of people directly targeted but to sow fear in the rest of the population. Terrorism is an unusual military tactic in that it depends on the response of the onlookers. If we are not terrorized, then the attack didn’t work. Alas, this one worked very well.
Hat tip: Cameron Bode, Excerpticize.
Security theatre: an asylum for authoritarian nuttiness
Last Saturday, 57-year-old Jules Paul Bouloute, got off a flight from Haiti to New York. While attempting to find his way out of Kennedy Airport’s American Airlines Terminal, he accidentally opened an emergency exit door and set off an alarm.
Jules Paul Bouloute
This has happened to most of us. In confusion, inattention, or an ill-considered attempt to find a shortcut, we open a restricted door and set off an alarm. Sometimes it leads to an embarrassed chat with the on-duty Commissionaire; sometimes there are no consequences at all.
In Bouloute’s case, however, security officials evacuated Terminal 8 for more than two hours. Police scoured the building with dogs and SWAT teams, and required hapless passengers to go through security theatre screening a second time. Arrivals were stuck on the tarmac; departures delayed for hours.
As for Bouloute, he was charged with first-degree criminal tampering and third-degree criminal trespass, and he faces up to seven years in prison.
Salon columnist Patrick Smith, an airline pilot, analyzes the consequences:
[W]hat shocks me the most is that throughout all the coverage of the incident, including numerous interviews with ticked-off passengers and somber-voiced officials, not once has anybody raised the point that maybe — just maybe — we overreacted. Everyone, instead, is eager to blame Bouloute.
“As a result of the defendant’s actions, thousands of people were required to evacuate and to be rescreened by TSA, causing substantial delays in the airlines’ schedules,” District Attorney Richard Browne said in a statement.
No, I’m sorry, Mr. District Attorney, but that’s not it. What caused the delays and what hassled so many travelers was not the defendant’s actions, but our mindless and hysterical response to them.
Smith goes on to recite the interesting history of air terrorism, and details how a country that once took real terrorist attacks in stride became a “nation of scaredy-cats.” He cites other recent examples of ludicrous overreaction, and urges us all to calm down.
Calming down will not make us “less safe,” as security zealots are wont to argue. Quite the opposite, it would free up time and resources, allowing us to focus on more credible and potent problems.
The whole piece is well worth a read.
All we like sheep – training division
Contrarian reader Andrew Bourke flags the droll consumer reviews of the Playmobil Security Checkpoint on the Amazon website (scroll way down). Moneyquote:
I was a little disappointed when I first bought this item, because the functionality is limited. My 5 year old son pointed out that the passenger’s shoes cannot be removed. Then, we placed a deadly fingernail file underneath the passenger’s scarf, and neither the detector doorway nor the security wand picked it up. My son said “that’s the worst security ever!”. But it turned out to be okay, because when the passenger got on the Playmobil B757 and tried to hijack it, she was mobbed by a couple of other heroic passengers, who only sustained minor injuries in the scuffle, which were treated at the Playmobil Hospital. The best thing about this product is that it teaches kids about the realities of living in a high-surveillence society.
Andrew also passes along this commentary from xkcd.com:
Contrarian’s friend Adrian, who has skirted more security checkpoints than Contrarian has boarded planes, wonders what improvements I would like to see in airport security.
The generally accepted view is that the El Al method of interviewing (‘profiling’) each passenger is the best, almost the only, sure method. Indeed, there were moves adopt it in the USA after 9/11, but objections from namby-pamby leftist self proclaimed libertarians [like me! - ed.] precluded this.
Finally, James Fallows has consolidated his many posts on this subject here.
All we like sheep – feedback (updated)
A cautious Contrarian reader writes:
A friendly caution about taking pictures inside the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority pre-board screening area: If noticed, likely to attract unwanted security attention.
Noted — but isn’t this just further evidence that the real purpose of security theater is not to keep Canadians safe but to buttress the puffed-up functionaries charged with upholding these useless, colossally wasteful procedures?
Left: Stanfield International Airport 7 a.m., October 15. The security queue extends past the Clearwater Seafoods kiosk to the Air Canada check-in counter. Right: Half and hour later, inside the CATSA security zone.
The overwhelming evidence is that airport searches do not make us safer, but they make us more sheep-like. For more discussion of the witless “security” precautions we have accepted since 9/11, see:
Jeffrey Goldberg’s Atlantic Magazine account of the ease with which smart terrorists could thwart airport screening.
John Mueller’s Foreign Affairs article contending that there reason there have been no attacks since 9/11 is that “that there are no terrorists within the United States, and few have the means or the inclination to strike from abroad.”
A Foreign Affairs panel discussion of Mueller’s thesis: “Are we safe yet?”
James Fallows’s many sensible contributions to the national “security” debate: “Declaring Victory,” “A Nation of Ninnies,” ” The End of 9/11,” and “Civilize Homeland Security.”
Ben Friedman on The War on Hype: “Conventional wisdom says that none of us is safe from terrorism. The truth is that almost all of us are.”
The blog, Crypto-Gram newsletter, and articles of security guru Bruce Schneier, who coined the term, “security theater.”
Nova Scotia could contribute to the reversal of this craziness by easing up on the intrusive “security” fooferah that has infested provincial public buildings.
Update: Contrarian reader Jeffrey Pinhey writes:
In Rome, earlier this year, I was screened very carefully getting into a security area. Once in, I was able to buy a large, heavy glass bottle of olive oil with a nice long handle… I mean neck. I then was allowed to just carry this on to the plane with me as carry on. This was a significant weapon, at least the equal of a box cutter, even without breaking it and having the sharp glass. Yet they took away a tiny hat pin from a little old lady.
All we like sheep – updated
Stanfield International Airport, 7:24 a.m.
Update: Peter Spurway of the Airport Authority explains: “Yup. Possible security breach was being investigated. Pre board screening closed temporarily. Flights held. Hope your disruption not too long.”
