Contrarian has produced dozens of posts about the stupidity of airport security as practiced by the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority and the Department of Homeland Security. How about some sensible security ideas? Pilot and author Lane Wallace, guest-blogging for James Fallows, has a few ideas. She begins by noting that airports aren't the only places vulnerable to attacks like the one that killed 34 people in Moscow Monday:
lane_wallaceRussian President Dimitri A. Medvedev has said that airport officials at Domodedovo must be held accountable for failing to prevent the attacks. I feel for those officials. Because the ugly truth of the matter is unless we want to prohibit more than five people from gathering in any given place, targets will exist for people willing to sacrifice their lives to hurt others. And it is impossible to police or screen public gathering places well enough to keep any attempted attack from succeeding... The bombing at Domodedovo happened to take place in a public area at an airport, so much of the alarm and reaction is (rightly or wrongly) going to focus on airport security. But really, the same bomb could have been detonated, and done just as much damage, raising the same issues of security and access, in any crowded, public area. Think, for a moment, how many people are in Grand Central Station at rush hour. It more than rivals any airport reception area. Or in Times Square on any given evening. Or in Macy's, the morning after Thanksgiving. Or at Rockefeller Center when the Christmas tree is lit. The list goes on and on. The point is, finding a place where a suicide bomb explosion will kill 30 or 50 people is just not that tough to do. And there is simply no way to eliminate that risk.
So what to do about it? Wallace offers three sensible suggestions after the jump:

I'm late getting to this, but Washington Post columnist Fareed Zakaria captured the fundamental fallacy of Washington's reaction to the Christmas Day [un-]Bomber. The purpose of terrorism is to provoke an overreaction. Its real aim is not to kill the hundreds of people directly targeted but to sow fear in the rest of the population. Terrorism is an unusual military tactic in that it depends on the response of the onlookers. If we are not terrorized, then the attack didn't work. Alas, this one worked very well. Hat tip: Cameron Bode, Excerpticize....

Last Saturday, 57-year-old Jules Paul Bouloute, got off a flight from Haiti to New York. While attempting to find his way out of  Kennedy Airport's American Airlines Terminal, he accidentally opened an emergency exit door and set off an alarm. [caption id="attachment_4221" align="alignleft" width="250" caption="Jules Paul Bouloute"][/caption] This has happened to most of  us. In confusion, inattention, or an ill-considered attempt to find a shortcut, we open a restricted door and set off an alarm. Sometimes it leads to an embarrassed chat with the on-duty Commissionaire; sometimes there are no consequences at all. In Bouloute's case, however, security officials evacuated Terminal 8 for...

A week after the attempted Christmas Day bombing of a Northwest Airlines fight, two polar-opposite American columnists — one left, one right — have come to nearly identical conclusions about the essential danger posed by airline security restrictions. From the right, a New Year's Day column by the New York Times's David Brooks decried a citizenry that "expect[s] perfection from government and then throw[s] temper tantrums when it is not achieved." [T]he Transportation Security Administration has to be seen doing something, so it added another layer to its stage play, “Security Theater” — more baggage regulations, more in-flight restrictions. At some point, it’s...

[caption id="attachment_1057" align="alignright" width="200" caption="Steven Bierfeldt: Flush, iPhone-carrying, libertarian security risk"][/caption] Last March,  Steven Bierfeldt, a 25-year-old libertarian who works for US Congressman Ron Paul, tried to board a plane at Lambert-St. Louis International Airport, when a security x-ray machine turned up a metal box in his carry-on baggage containing $4700 in cash, proceeds from the sale of tee-shirts and literature at a Ron Paul event the previous day. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) officials hauled Bierfeldt out of the lineup and detained him for half an hour, demanding to know the source of the (perfectly legal) money, along with a raft of...